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Understanding participation in terrorism can be thought of an application of the 
economics of occupational choice.  Several studies have found that people who carry out 
terrorist attacks tend to be better educated and more advantaged than members of the 
population from which they are drawn (Russell and Miller, 1983, Krueger and 
Maleckova, 2003, Berrebi, 2008, Sageman, 2004).   This research has focused on 
terrorists who operated outside the U.S.   In addition, most of the available research is 
limited to individuals who actually succeeded in carrying out terrorist acts.  Benmelech 
and Berrebi (2007) find that failed suicide bombers in Israel tend to have less human 
capital than successful suicide bombers, and they interpret this evidence as consistent 
with a Roy-type of assignment model.  If this tendency holds more generally, studies that 
are restricted to terrorists who succeeded in carrying out attacks would be biased in the 
direction of finding more skilled terrorists due to sample selection.  This paper attempts 
to overcome both of these limitations by contrasting the backgrounds of individuals who 
allegedly joined homegrown Islamic terrorist cells in the U.S. with other Muslims 
residing in the U.S.   
Specifically, we attempted to track down the backgrounds of all those involved in 
homegrown Islamic terrorist plots since the first World Trade Center attack in 1993.  To 
be considered a homegrown terrorist plot, the plot had to have been conceived in the U.S. 
and to have had substantial involvement of U.S. residents.  Thus the first attack on the 
World Trade Center is included, but the second one is not, because the first attack 
involved substantial participation of residents while the second attack was planned 
abroad and carried out by individuals who came to the U.S. for the specific purpose of  
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carrying out the attack.  Other plots in the sample include the Fort Dix plot, the Brooklyn 
Bridge plot, the Columbus Shopping Mall plot, the Toledo plot, and groups such as the 
Buffalo Six and Virginia Jihad.  Fortunately, most of these plots never advanced very far.  
The sample includes 63 individuals who were indicted or convicted for involvement in 
terrorist activities.  We compare these individuals to a representative sample of American 
Muslims from 2007.  The data are described in detail in the next section.   
Section 3 compares the characteristics of alleged domestic Islamic terrorists with 
those of the population of Muslims residing in the U.S.   The alleged terrorists are 
somewhat better educated and younger, on average, than the general population of 
Muslim Americans.  This profile is similar to what has been found for terrorists more 
generally (Krueger, 2007).    The alleged domestic terrorists are less likely to be 
American citizens than other Muslims living in the U.S. and slightly less likely to be 
converts to Islam.  Lastly, we find that alleged domestic terrorists who had completed 
more schooling were closer to carrying out terrorist plots.   
 
Data 
A.  Homegrown Islamic Terrorists  
Data were assembled from several sources.  As a starting point, the Homeland 
Security Administration provided the author with an unofficial list of domestic Islamic 
terrorist groups and plots, which consisted of links to each group or plot in Wikipedia. 
This source was supplemented with information on the identity of alleged terrorists from  
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Leiken (2006) and the FBI's terrorism prevention reviews from 2002-2005 (available 
from www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/ terrorism2002_2005.htm).
1   
Once individuals’ names were identified, information on their country of birth, 
citizenship status, educational attainment, occupation, age (at the time they became 
involved in their alleged terrorist activity), and religious background was assembled from 
searching newspaper articles, Google searches, Lexis Nexis's scholastic service, legal 
documents and other unclassified sources.
2  Data were generally available for age, 
citizenship status, and country of birth.  Education and occupational status were more 
difficult to obtain, but often available from local newspapers.   
The term homegrown terrorist should be taken with a grain of salt. Although all of 
the 63 individuals in the sample have been charged with terrorist activities, one could 
question whether some were serious plotters or instead were entrapped by overly zealous 
law enforcement officials.  In addition, our definition of homegrown includes a plot that 
targeted Canada and one that originated from Canada.  Nevertheless, this dataset 
represents the first attempt to systematically study the backgrounds of the individuals 
drawn into homegrown Islamic terrorist cells in the United States.  
B.  Data on American Muslims 
The backgrounds of homegrown terrorists are compared with those of a 
representative sample of 1,050 Muslims living in the U.S.A. who were surveyed by the 
                                                 
1 The individuals in the sample were allegedly involved in the first World Trade Center bombing, the Fort 
Dix plot, the Brooklyn Bridge plot, the Columbus Shopping Mall plot, the Toledo plot, the dirty bomb plot, 
the Millenium bombing plot, or members of groups including the Buffalo Six, the Virginia Jihad, the 
Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS prison Islam), the Houston Taliban, the Portland Seven, and a smattering 
of other individuals, such as financiers and alleged al-Qaeda operatives.    




3  Individuals age 18 and older were interviewed from January 24 
to April 30 of 2007.  The interview lasted around 30 minutes and was conducted in four 
languages.  Respondents were paid $50 for the participation.   Identifying a representative 
sample of a relatively small group such as Muslims in the U.S.A. is a difficult task, and 
the survey involved a complex sampling design that is described in Pew Research Center 
(2007).  Random digit dialing and a sample of individuals with names that are common 
among Muslims were used to identify the sample.   
Sample weights were created by Pew to make the weighted sample representative 
of the population.  The sample weights are used in all tabulations of the Pew data.  The 
sum of the weights approximately equals the total number of Muslims age 18 and older in 
the U.S. population.  (The mean weight per observation was 1107 and the lowest was 65.)  
The data on homegrown terrorists is self-weighting, as, in principle, it is the universe of 
homegrown Islamic terrorists in the period under study.  Consequently, when the two 
samples are pooled together the homegrown terrorists are each assigned a weight of 1.  
The homegrown terrorists represented .005 percent of the weighted sample of Muslims.   
 
Results  
Table 1 presents means of the two samples.  Because the homegrown terrorists are 
all males, the Pew sample of American Muslims is tabulated for men and women 
combined and separately for men.  In many respects, the profile of the alleged 
homegrown terrorists is similar to the profiles of terrorists more generally (see Krueger, 
2007 for a survey of the backgrounds of members of various terrorist groups). The 
                                                 
3The data can be downloaded from the Pew Research Center website at 
http://pewsocialtrends.org/downloads/.  I thank Greg Smith for answering questions about the data set and 
Doug Mills for programming assistance.    
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homegrown terrorists were notably younger than the population, for example.  All of the 
terrorists were between age 18 and 46.  The average years of schooling of the homegrown 
terrorists is about a year greater than that of all Muslims living in the U.S., although the 
difference is not statistically significant.   
<TABLE 1 NEAR HERE> 
Figure 1 compares the education distribution of the homegrown terrorists and all 
Muslims living in America. The homegrown terrorists are decidedly clustered in the 
middle of the education distribution, in the “some college” and college range.  They are 
underrepresented in the high school and below and post college ranks.  For those for 
whose occupation we could track down, the homegrown terrorists were primarily in 
middle-class and lower-middle-class jobs. As best we can tell, the homegrown terrorists 
were no more likely to be idle – defined as neither working nor attending school -- than 
the population of Muslim Americans.  If the sample of American Muslims is limited to 
men, however, only 27 percent are idle, compared with 35 percent of the alleged 
homegrown terrorists, but this gap could easily have occurred by chance (p=0.29).   
Compared with the population of American Muslims, the homegrown terrorists 
are less likely to be U.S. citizens.  The homegrown terrorists were slightly more likely to 
have been born in the U.S. than other Muslims living in the U.S.  The Arab region is over 
represented among the birthplace of homegrown terrorists and “other regions” (primarily 
Iran) are underrepresented.  Just over 20 percent of the homegrown terrorists were in the 
U.S. illegally, either because they entered the country illegally or because they 
overstayed a visa.  Comparable figures are not available for the population of American 
Muslims.   
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<FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE> 
Table 2 presents probit estimates of the effect of various variables on the 
likelihood that an American Muslim is charged as being a homegrown terrorist.  (The 
coefficients are scaled to represent marginal effects on the probability of participation 
using the dprobit command in Stata).  The first two columns present results for men and 
women pooled together, and the last two columns present estimates just for men because 
all of the alleged terrorists are men.  In both samples, education is positively associated 
with the likelihood of being charged as a terrorist, despite the fact that the sample of 
homegrown terrorists consists overwhelmingly of individuals who never managed to 
carry out a terrorist attack.  The model in column (4) implies that an additional year of 
education raises the likelihood that a male will become an alleged terrorist by 4 percent.
4   
<TABLE 2 NEAR HERE> 
Holding other variables in the model constant, younger individuals are more 
likely to become involved in terrorist activities, a finding that is pervasive in the 
literature.  Benjamin (2007) provides anecdotal evidence that a large number of jihadists 
are converts to Islam.  He includes Jose Padillo, who is part of the sample analyzed here, 
as an example.  Contrary to the presumption that the zeal of converts leads them to be 
drawn to terrorism, we do not find evidence that converts to Islam are more likely to be 
among the alleged homegrown terrorists.   
Citizens are less likely to become involved in domestic terrorism than are 
noncitizens.  This finding is seemingly inconsistent with Butcher and Piehl’s (2007) 
finding that immigrants are much less likely to be incarcerated than are native born 
                                                 
4 Bear in mind that this semi-elasticity is calculated from a very low base, as only one in 24,000 American 
Muslims is ever charged with being a homegrown terrorist.    
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Americans.  Country of birth also has some predictive power.  Perhaps most striking is 
the finding that none of those charged with involvement in Islamic terrorism in the U.S. 
are from Iran despite the large number of Iranian-born Muslims in American; this 
discrepancy accounts for the negative coefficient on the “other region” dummy variable 
in the probit equations.   
The low pseudo R-squares indicate the difficulty of profiling of homegrown 
terrorists based on their personal characteristics.  Only 6 to 8 percent of the variability in 
the likelihood of participation in domestic terrorism can be accounted for by personal 
characteristics.   
The final empirical issue considered here is whether more highly educated 
terrorists were closer to succeeding than less highly educated terrorists.  To do this, we 
assigned a score from 0 to 5 indicating how close the groups were to executing their plan.  
For example, members of the Buffalo Six were assigned a 0 because it is not clear from 
the public record whether they were actually planning an attack, the Fort Dix plotters 
were assigned a 3 because they made some headway toward gaining access to the 
military base but were careless in their preparation (which led to their capture), and those 
involved in the first attack on the World Trade Center were assigned a 5 because they 
executed their plan.  Those involved in the second World Trade Center attack, who were 
also given a rating of 5, were included in this analysis to increase the sample size.  These 
ratings are subjective, but I suspect they reflect the operational effectiveness of the 
individuals involved.   
The correlation between education and the 0-5 operational effectiveness score was 
0.24 (p=.06).  If the 0-5 effectiveness score is regressed on years of education, convert  
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status and age, only education is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Although 
not overwhelming evidence, these results are consistent with Benmelech and Berrebi’s 
findings for Palestinian terrorists: higher educated individuals were closer to executing 
terrorist plots within the U.S. than were less educated individuals.   
 
Discussion  
The hodgepodge of alleged homegrown Islamic terrorists that were studied here 
do not appear especially deprived.  They were about as likely to be idle (neither working 
nor enrolled in schools) as were other American Muslims, and they had slightly more 
education than the average American Muslim.  These findings are a contrast to what is 
typically found in studies of participation in criminal behavior more generally.   
  Because a fairly comprehensive set of participants in terrorist activities were 
included in the sample, and possibly some who were entrapped or innocuous, the study is 
able to provide a more complete analysis of the supply of would-be terrorists than is 
available from studies that are limited to individuals who actually carry out extreme 
terrorist acts.  The fact that many of the terrorist cells were small, autonomous groups 
composed of volunteers instead of recruits, also suggests that the results reflect supply 
factors rather than demand factors.  Interestingly, the strongest predictors of participation 
– namely, education and youth -- are similar to those that were found in previous studies 
that restricted the sample of terrorists to those who successfully carried out terrorist acts.  
One possible interpretation of the results is that youth and the highly educated tend to 
hold more extreme views, or are more willing to try to act on extreme views.  This may 
also explain why the profile of terrorists is different from the profile of typical criminals.  
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A lack of legitimate opportunities may lead people to crime, while terrorism is more 
likely motivated by a desire to pursue a political agenda.   
The analysis also highlights the difficulty of identifying terrorists from their 
demographic characteristics.  The relatively low R-squares suggest that participation in 
terrorism has a large unpredictable component.  Equally importantly, past patterns may 
not extend in the future.   It is especially difficult to generalize from anecdotal evidence 
given the wide dispersion in terrorists’ backgrounds at a point in time.  Converts to Islam, 
for example, were not over represented among the alleged homegrown terrorists 
compared with the population of U.S. Muslims, despite some notable cases of converts 
joining terrorist cells.   
Nevertheless, the finding that better educated terrorists were operationally more 
proficient suggests a benefit from focusing anti-terrorism efforts on individuals who have 
high levels of education and technical skills.  Not only are these individuals more likely 
to see their plans through to completion if they should join terrorist causes, the positive 
correlation between education and participation in terrorism suggests that there is a 
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Table 1:  Sample Averages (standard deviation in parentheses)  
 
                                       U.S. Muslims    Homegrown Islamic   
      All     Men    Terrorists 
   
Years of School  12.94    13.02    13.77 
      (3.47)    (3.37)     (2.41) 
 
Age      38.74    38.92    27.85 
      (13.88)   (13.65)   (6.68) 
 
Male      51.9%   100%    100% 
 
Idle       35.6%   27.4%   34.9% 
 
Convert    22.8%   23.5%    13.3% 
 
U.S. Citizen    75.0%   77.5%     57.1% 
 
Born in: 
USA      34.3%   37.4%    39.7% 
Arab Region    19.0%   17.8%    36.5% 
South Asia    17.8%   17.2%    14.3% 
Europe       6.0%     7.2%      6.5% 
Other      22.9%   20.5%      3.2% 
 
Notes:  Idle is defined as neither working nor attending school.  Convert is defined as 
someone who was not born a Muslim.  Other region mainly includes African and Iran.  
For column (1) sample size is 1,031 for years of schooling, 1,027 for age, 1,048 for 
convert, and 1,050 for all other variables.  For column 2 sample size is 546 for years of 
schooling, 544 for age, 554 for convert, and 555 for all other variables.   For column (3) 
sample size is 47 for education, 61 for age, and 63 for all other variables.  Weights are 
used for columns (1) and (2).   
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Table 2.  Probit estimates for likelihood of being charged a homegrown terrorist 
 
 
      Men and Women                 Men______ 
(1)                  (2)      (3)    (4) 
Years of Schooling  .033**   .036**     .027**   .038* 
      (.011)    (.016)      (.012)    (.018) 
Age      ---              -.022***    ---    -.022*** 
          (.004)          (.005) 
Convert (1=yes)  ---    -.013      ---    -.011 
          (.121)          (.147) 
Citizen (1=yes)  ---              -.267**    ---     -.368** 
          (.126)          (.154) 
Idle (1=yes)    ---      .059      ---    .264 
          (.102)          (.121) 
Birth Region: 
Arab      .039    -.067      .061    .031 
      (.090)    (.150)      (.099)    (.175) 
South Asia     -.114    -.164      -.107    -.118 
      (.106)    (.147)      (.117)    (.172) 
Europe     -.174    -.324*      -.215    -.370 
       (.185)   (.189)      (.201)    (.234) 
Other      -.607***  -.722***    -.602**  -.765** 
      (.225)    (.255)      (.238)    (.300) 
 
Pseudo R-Square  .021    .064      .021    .082 
 
Chi-Square    11.7    46.0      10.6    41.4 
 
Sample Size    1,078    1,067      593    586 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable equals 1 for alleged homegrown terrorists and 0 for others.  
All equations also include a constant.  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  
All estimates use sample weights.  Base group for birth region is U.S.A.   
 
* Statistically significant at .10 level. 
** Statistically significant at .05 level. 
*** Statistically significant at .01 level. 